Book III. Chapters 6–12, First examples of moral virtues Nicomachean Ethics

hektor, trojan hero. aristotle questions courage.



the courage of citizen soldiers. aristotle says largely result of penalties cowardice , honors bravery, closest type of seeming courage real courage, important making army fight if brave, different true courage because not based on voluntary actions aimed @ being beautiful in own right. aristotle perhaps surprisingly notes homeric heroes such hector had type of courage.
people experienced in particular danger seem courageous. might seen amongst professional soldiers, not panic @ false alarms. in perhaps surprising remark aristotle notes such men might better in war courageous people. however, notes when odds change such soldiers run.
spirit or anger (thumos) looks courage. such people can blind dangers run though, meaning animals can brave in way, , unlike courageous people not aiming @ beautiful acts. type of bravery same of mule risking punishment keep grazing, or adulterer taking risks. aristotle notes type of spirit shows affinity true courage , combined deliberate choice , purpose seems true courage.
the boldness of feels confident based on many past victories not true courage. person overconfident when drunk, apparent courage based on lack of fear, , disappear if circumstances change. courageous person not of victory , endure fear.
similarly, there people overconfident due ignorance. overconfident person might stand while when things not turn out expected, person confident out of ignorance run @ first signs of such things.

chapter 9. discussed in book ii already, courage might described achieving mean in confidence , fear, must remember these means not in middle between 2 extremes. avoiding fear more important in aiming @ courage avoiding overconfidence. in examples above, overconfident people called courageous, or considered close courageous. aristotle said in book ii that—with moral virtues such courage—the extreme 1 s normal desires tend away important aim towards.

when comes courage, heads people towards pain in circumstances, , therefore away otherwise desire. men called courageous enduring pain. there can pleasant end of courageous actions obscured circumstances. death is, definition, possibility—so 1 example of virtue not bring pleasant result.

aristotle s treatment of subject compared plato s. courage dealt plato in socratic dialogue named laches.

temperance (sōphrosunē)

temperance (sōphrosunē, translated soundness of mind, moderation, discretion) mean regards pleasure. adds concerned pains in lesser , different way. vice occurs in same situations excess regards pleasure (akolasia, translated licentiousness, intemperance, profligacy, dissipation etc.). pleasures can divided of soul , of body. concerned pleasures of soul, honor, learning, example, or excessive pleasure in talking, not referred objects of being temperate or dissipate. also, not bodily pleasures relevant, example delighting in sights or sounds or smells not things temperate or profligate about, unless smell of food or perfume triggers yearning. temperance , dissipation concern animal-like, aphrodisiac, pleasures of touch , taste, , indeed type of touch, because dissipated people not delight in refined distinguishing of flavors, , nor indeed delight in feelings 1 gets during workout or massage in gymnasium.

chapter 11. desires of food , drink, , indeed sex, shared in way. not has same particular manifestations of these desires. in natural desires says aristotle, few people go wrong, , in 1 direction, towards much. fulfill 1 s need, whereas people err either desiring beyond need, or else desiring ought not desire. regarding pains, temperance different courage. temperate person not need endure pains, rather intemperate person feels pain pleasures, excess longing.

the opposite rare, , therefore there no special name person insensitive pleasures , delight. temperate person desires things not impediments health, nor contrary beautiful, nor beyond person s resources. such person judges according right reason (orthos logos).

chapter 12. intemperance more willingly chosen vice cowardice, because positively seeks pleasure, while cowardice avoids pain, , pain can derange person s choice. reproach intemperance more, because easier habituate oneself avoid problem. way children act has likeness vice of akolasia. child needs live instructions, desiring part of human soul must in harmony rational part. desire without understanding can become insatiable, , can impair reason.

plato s treatment of same subject once again compared aristotle s, apparently aristotle s intention (see book i, explained above):

every virtue, comes under examination in platonic dialogues, expands far beyond bounds of ordinary understanding: sōphrosunē undergoes, in plato s charmides, explosive expansion – first definition proposed; quiet temperament (159b), knowledge of , other knowledges (166e).

aristotle discusses subject further in book vii.