Books II–V: Concerning excellence of character or moral virtue Nicomachean Ethics

1 books ii–v: concerning excellence of character or moral virtue

1.1 book ii: virtues of character can described means
1.2 book iii. chapters 1–5: moral virtue conscious choice
1.3 book iii. chapters 6–12, first examples of moral virtues

1.3.1 courage
1.3.2 temperance (sōphrosunē)


1.4 book iv. second set of examples of moral virtues

1.4.1 liberality or generosity (eleutheriotēs)
1.4.2 magnificence
1.4.3 magnanimity or greatness of soul
1.4.4 balanced ambitiousness concerning smaller honors
1.4.5 gentleness (praótēs) concerning anger
1.4.6 friendship, between being obsequious , surly
1.4.7 honesty oneself: virtue between boasting , self-deprecation
1.4.8 being witty or charming
1.4.9 sense of shame (not virtue)


1.5 book v: justice , fairness: moral virtue needing special discussion

books ii–v: concerning excellence of character or moral virtue
book ii: virtues of character can described means

aristotle says whereas virtue of thinking needs teaching, experience , time, virtue of character (moral virtue) comes consequence of following right habits. according aristotle potential virtue nature in humans, whether virtues come present or not not determined human nature.

trying follow method of starting approximate things gentlemen can agree on, , looking @ circumstances, aristotle says can describe virtues things destroyed deficiency or excess. runs away becomes coward, while fears nothing rash. in way virtue bravery can seen depending upon mean between 2 extremes. (for reason, aristotle considered proponent of doctrine of golden mean.) people become habituated first performing actions virtuous, possibly because of guidance of teachers or experience, , in turn these habitual actions become real virtue choose actions deliberately.

according aristotle, character understood (i.e. 1 s virtue or vice), not tendency or habit affects when feel pleasure or pain. virtuous person feels pleasure when performs beautiful or noble (kalos) actions. person not virtuous find or perceptions of pleasant misleading. reason, concern virtue or politics requires consideration of pleasure , pain. when person virtuous actions, example chance, or under advice, not yet virtuous person. not in productive arts, thing being made judged made or not. virtuous person, 1 s virtuous actions must meet 3 conditions: (a) done knowingly, (b) chosen own sakes, , (c) chosen according stable disposition (not @ whim, or in way acting person might change choice about). , knowing virtuous not enough. according aristotle s analysis, 3 kinds of things come present in soul virtue is: feeling (pathos), inborn predisposition or capacity (dunamis), or stable disposition has been acquired (hexis). in fact, has been mentioned virtue made of hexeis, on occasion contrast feelings , capacities made clearer—neither chosen, , neither praiseworthy in way virtue is.

comparing virtue productive arts (technai) arts, virtue of character must not making of human, way humans own work well. being skilled in art can described mean between excess , deficiency: when done not want take away or add them. aristotle points simplification in idea of hitting mean. in terms of best, aim @ extreme, not mean, , in terms of base, opposite.

chapter 7 turns general comments specifics. aristotle gives list of character virtues , vices later discusses in books ii , iii. sachs points out, (2002, p. 30) appears list not fixed, because differs between nicomachean , eudemian ethics, , because aristotle repeats several times rough outline.

aristotle mentions mean conditions involving feelings: sense of shame praised, or said in excess or deficiency. righteous indignation (greek: nemesis) sort of mean between joy @ misfortunes of others , envy. aristotle says such cases need discussed later, before discussion of justice in book v, require special discussion. nicomachean ethics discusses sense of shame @ point, , not righteous indignation (which discussed in eudemian ethics book viii).

in practice aristotle explains people tend more nature towards pleasures, , therefore see virtues being relatively closer less pleasant extremes. while every case can different, given difficulty of getting mean right indeed important guard against going pleasant , easy way. rule of thumb shown in later parts of ethics apply bodily pleasures, , shown wrong accurate general rule in book x.

book iii. chapters 1–5: moral virtue conscious choice

chapter 1 distinguishes actions chosen relevant virtue, , whether actions blamed, forgiven, or pitied.

aristotle divides actions 3 categories instead of two:-

voluntary (ekousion) acts.
involuntary or unwilling (akousion) acts, simplest case people not praise or blame. in such cases person not choose wrong thing, example if wind carries person off, or if person has wrong understanding of particular facts of situation. note ignorance of aims , bad, such people of bad character have, not people typically excuse ignorance in sense. acting on account of ignorance seems different acting while being ignorant .
non-voluntary or non willing actions (ouk ekousion) bad actions done choice, or more (as in case of animals , children when desire or spirit causes action) whenever source of moving of parts instrumental in such actions in oneself , oneself either or not . however, these actions not taken because preferred in own right, rather because options available worse.

it concerning third class of actions there doubt whether should praised or blamed or condoned in different cases.

several more critical terms defined , discussed:

deliberate choice (proairesis), seems determine 1 s character more 1 s actions . things done on spur of moment, , things done animals , children can willing, driven desire , spirit , not call true choice. choice rational, , according understanding of aristotle, choice can in opposition desire. choice not wishing things 1 not believe can achieved, such immortality, rather concerning realistic aims. choice not opinion, because our choices make type of person are, , not true or false. distinguishes choice before choice made there rational deliberation or thinking things through.
deliberation (bouleusis), @ least sane people, not include theoretical contemplation universal , everlasting things, nor things might far away, nor things can know precisely, such letters. deliberate things , matters of action , concerning things unclear how turn out. deliberation therefore not how reason ends pursue, health example, how think through ways can try achieve them. choice decided both desire , deliberation.
wishing (boulēsis) not deliberation. cannot people wish definition, , although wished appears good, still variable. importantly worthy (spoudaios) man wish good. people misled pleasure, seems them good, though not .

chapter 5 considers choice, willingness , deliberation in cases exemplify not virtue, vice. virtue , vice according aristotle . means although no 1 willingly unhappy, vice definition involves actions decided on willingly. (as discussed earlier, vice comes bad habits , aiming @ wrong things, not deliberately aiming unhappy.) lawmakers work in way, trying encourage , discourage right voluntary actions, don t concern involuntary actions. tend not lenient people have chosen avoid, such being drunk, or being ignorant of things easy know, or of having allowed develop bad habits , bad character. concerning point, aristotle asserts though people bad character may ignorant , seem unable choose right things, condition stems decisions voluntary, same poor health can develop past choices—and, while no 1 blames ill-formed nature, people censure way through lack of exercise , neglect.

the vices then, voluntary virtues are. states people have unconscious not realize importance of allowing live badly, , dismisses idea different people have different innate visions of good.

book iii. chapters 6–12, first examples of moral virtues

aristotle deals separately of specific character virtues, in form similar listing @ end of book ii, starting courage , temperance.

courage

courage means holding mean position in 1 s feelings of confidence , fear. courage, however, not thought relate fear of evil things right fear, disgrace—and courage not word man not fear danger wife , children, or punishment breaking law. instead courage refers confidence , fear concerning fearful thing, death, , potentially beautiful form of death, death in battle.

the courageous man, says aristotle, fears terrors not feels need fear, endures fears , feels confident in rational way, sake of beautiful (kalos)—because virtue aims at. beautiful action comes beautiful character , aims @ beauty. vices opposed courage discussed @ end of book ii. although there no special name it, people have excessive fearlessness mad, aristotle remarks describe celts being in time. aristotle remarks rash people (thrasus), excessive confidence, cowards putting on brave face.

apart correct usage above, word courage applied 5 other types of character according aristotle:-

hektor, trojan hero. aristotle questions courage.



the courage of citizen soldiers. aristotle says largely result of penalties cowardice , honors bravery, closest type of seeming courage real courage, important making army fight if brave, different true courage because not based on voluntary actions aimed @ being beautiful in own right. aristotle perhaps surprisingly notes homeric heroes such hector had type of courage.
people experienced in particular danger seem courageous. might seen amongst professional soldiers, not panic @ false alarms. in perhaps surprising remark aristotle notes such men might better in war courageous people. however, notes when odds change such soldiers run.
spirit or anger (thumos) looks courage. such people can blind dangers run though, meaning animals can brave in way, , unlike courageous people not aiming @ beautiful acts. type of bravery same of mule risking punishment keep grazing, or adulterer taking risks. aristotle notes type of spirit shows affinity true courage , combined deliberate choice , purpose seems true courage.
the boldness of feels confident based on many past victories not true courage. person overconfident when drunk, apparent courage based on lack of fear, , disappear if circumstances change. courageous person not of victory , endure fear.
similarly, there people overconfident due ignorance. overconfident person might stand while when things not turn out expected, person confident out of ignorance run @ first signs of such things.

chapter 9. discussed in book ii already, courage might described achieving mean in confidence , fear, must remember these means not in middle between 2 extremes. avoiding fear more important in aiming @ courage avoiding overconfidence. in examples above, overconfident people called courageous, or considered close courageous. aristotle said in book ii that—with moral virtues such courage—the extreme 1 s normal desires tend away important aim towards.

when comes courage, heads people towards pain in circumstances, , therefore away otherwise desire. men called courageous enduring pain. there can pleasant end of courageous actions obscured circumstances. death is, definition, possibility—so 1 example of virtue not bring pleasant result.

aristotle s treatment of subject compared plato s. courage dealt plato in socratic dialogue named laches.

temperance (sōphrosunē)

temperance (sōphrosunē, translated soundness of mind, moderation, discretion) mean regards pleasure. adds concerned pains in lesser , different way. vice occurs in same situations excess regards pleasure (akolasia, translated licentiousness, intemperance, profligacy, dissipation etc.). pleasures can divided of soul , of body. concerned pleasures of soul, honor, learning, example, or excessive pleasure in talking, not referred objects of being temperate or dissipate. also, not bodily pleasures relevant, example delighting in sights or sounds or smells not things temperate or profligate about, unless smell of food or perfume triggers yearning. temperance , dissipation concern animal-like, aphrodisiac, pleasures of touch , taste, , indeed type of touch, because dissipated people not delight in refined distinguishing of flavors, , nor indeed delight in feelings 1 gets during workout or massage in gymnasium.

chapter 11. desires of food , drink, , indeed sex, shared in way. not has same particular manifestations of these desires. in natural desires says aristotle, few people go wrong, , in 1 direction, towards much. fulfill 1 s need, whereas people err either desiring beyond need, or else desiring ought not desire. regarding pains, temperance different courage. temperate person not need endure pains, rather intemperate person feels pain pleasures, excess longing.

the opposite rare, , therefore there no special name person insensitive pleasures , delight. temperate person desires things not impediments health, nor contrary beautiful, nor beyond person s resources. such person judges according right reason (orthos logos).

chapter 12. intemperance more willingly chosen vice cowardice, because positively seeks pleasure, while cowardice avoids pain, , pain can derange person s choice. reproach intemperance more, because easier habituate oneself avoid problem. way children act has likeness vice of akolasia. child needs live instructions, desiring part of human soul must in harmony rational part. desire without understanding can become insatiable, , can impair reason.

plato s treatment of same subject once again compared aristotle s, apparently aristotle s intention (see book i, explained above):

every virtue, comes under examination in platonic dialogues, expands far beyond bounds of ordinary understanding: sōphrosunē undergoes, in plato s charmides, explosive expansion – first definition proposed; quiet temperament (159b), knowledge of , other knowledges (166e).

aristotle discusses subject further in book vii.

book iv. second set of examples of moral virtues

the set of moral virtues discussed here involves getting balance of 1 s behavior right in social or political situations, leading themes become critical development of of important themes.

book iv described being bound norms of athenian gentleman in aristotle s time. while consistent approach aristotle said take in book i, in contrast approach of plato, there long running disagreement concerning whether immersion within viewpoint of probable intended readership starting point build more general conclusions, example in book vi, or else shows aristotle failed generalize, , ethical thinking based upon beliefs of greek gentleman of time.

liberality or generosity (eleutheriotēs)

this virtue observe when see how people act regards giving money, , things worth thought of in terms of money. 2 un-virtuous extremes wastefulness , stinginess (or meanness). stinginess taking money seriously, wastefulness, less strictly speaking, not opposite (an under estimation of importance of money) because caused being unrestrained. wasteful person destroyed own acts, , has many vices @ once. aristotle s approach defining correct balance treat money other useful thing, , virtue know how use money: giving right people, right amount @ right time. also, each of ethical virtues, aristotle emphasizes such person gets pleasures , pains @ doing virtuous , beautiful thing. aristotle goes out of way emphasize generosity not virtue associated making money, because, points out, virtuous person causes beautiful things, rather being recipient. aristotle points out not give gratitude , praise @ not taking (which might earn praise being just). aristotle points out generous people loved practically of recognized virtue, since confer benefits, , consists in giving , not deny generous people won t @ maintaining wealth, , easy cheat. aristotle goes further in direction saying might seem better wasteful stingy: wasteful person cured age, , running out of resources, , if not merely unrestrained people foolish rather vicious , badly brought-up. also, wasteful person @ least benefits someone. aristotle points out person virtue not money should not it, in order give decent sort of taking goes along decent sort of giving. having said however, people call wasteful not wasteful in sense opposed being generous, unrestrained , have many vices @ once. such people wasteful , stingy @ same time, , when trying generous take sources whence should not (for example pimps, loan sharks, gamblers, thieves), , give wrong people. such people can helped guidance, unlike stingy people, , people stingy. in fact, ends aristotle, stinginess reasonably called opposite of generosity, both because greater evil wastefulness, , because people go wrong more sort of wastefulness described .

magnificence

magnificence described virtue similar generosity except deals spending large amounts of wealth. aristotle says while magnificent man liberal, liberal man not magnificent . immoderate vices in case concerning making great display on wrong occasions , in wrong way . extremes avoided in order achieve virtue paltriness (rackham) or chintziness (sachs) on 1 hand , tastelessness or vulgarity on other. aristotle reminds here has said moral dispositions (hexeis) caused activities (energeia) perform, meaning magnificent person s virtue can seen way chooses correct magnificent acts @ right times. aim of magnificence, virtue, beautiful action, not magnificent man himself on public things, such private gifts have resemblance votive offerings. because aiming @ spectacle, person virtue not focusing on doing things cheaply, petty, , or may overspend. liberality, aristotle sees potential conflict between virtues, , being money. magnificence requires spending according means, @ least in sense poor man can not magnificent. vices of paltriness , vulgar chintziness not bring serious discredit, since not injurious others, nor excessively unseemly .

magnanimity or greatness of soul

book iv, chapter 3. magnanimity latinization of original greek used here, megalopsuchia, means greatness of soul. although word magnanimity has traditional connection aristotelian philosophy, has own tradition in english, causes confusion. why modern translations refer literally greatness of soul. in particular, term implied not greatness, person thought of worthy of great thing, or in other words sort of pride. (michael davis translates pride.) although term imply negative insinuation of lofty pride, aristotle usual tries define word should mean virtue. says not claims more deserves vain , indeed small-souled of seem man claims less deserves when deserts great . being vain, or being small-souled, 2 extremes fail achieve mean of virtue of magnanimity. small souled person, according aristotle, seems have bad him .

to have virtue of greatness of soul, , worthy of greatest, 1 must in true sense, , possess great in virtues. sachs points out: greatness of soul first of 4 virtues aristotle find require presence of virtues of character. others type of justice (1129b in book v), phronesis or practical judgment shown leaders (1144b in book vi), , friends (1157a in book viii). aristotle views magnanimity sort of adornment of moral virtues; makes them greater, , not arise without them.

aristotle focuses on question of greatest things 1 may worthy of. @ first says spoken of in terms of external goods, observes greatest of these must honor, because assign gods, , people of highest standing aim at. qualifies saying great souled people hold moderately toward every type of or bad fortune, honor. being good, , being worthy of honor more important. (the disdain of great souled person towards kinds of non-human things can make great souled people seem arrogant, un-deserving vain person.) leo strauss notes there close kinship between aristotle s justice , biblical justice, aristotle s magnanimity, means man s habitual claiming himself great honors while deserves these honors, alien bible . strauss describes bible rejecting concept of gentleman, , displays different approach problem of divine law in greek , biblical civilization. see below concerning sense of shame.

aristotle lists typical characteristics of great souled people:

they not take small risks, , not devoted risk taking, take big risks, without regard life, because worse life worth less great life. indeed, few things, , slow start on things, unless there great honor involved.
they not esteem popularly esteemed, nor others at. take few things seriously, , not anxious.
they gladly favors ashamed receive them, being apt forget favor another, or greater 1 in return. pleased hear discussion favors have done others, not favors done them.
they apt act more high-handedly person of high station person of middle or low standing, below them.
they frank in expressing opinions , open hate , love. not due fear, or esteem 1 has of other s opinions on own.
they lead life choose , not suits others, slave-like.
they not given wonder, nothing seems great them.
because expect others lesser, , not overly concerned praise, not apt bear grudges, not apt gossip, , not interested in speaking ill of enemies, except insult them.
they not apt complain necessities or small matters, nor ask help, not wanting imply such things important them.
they tend possess beautiful , useless things, rather productive ones.
they tend move , speak deep steady voice, rather being hasty or shrill, due anxiety.

a balanced ambitiousness concerning smaller honors

book iv, chapter 4. in parallel distinction of scale made between normal generosity , magnificence, aristotle proposes there 2 types of virtue associated honors, 1 concerned great honors, magnanimity or greatness of soul , 1 more normal honors. latter virtue kind of correct respect honor, aristotle had no greek word for, said between being ambitious (philotimos honor-loving) , unambitious (aphilotimos not honor loving) respect honor. include noble , manly person appropriate ambition, or less ambitious person moderate , temperate. (in other words, aristotle makes clear not think being more philotimos average inappropriate.) have correct balance in virtue means pursuing right types of honor right types of source of honor. in contrast, ambitious man balance wrong seeking excess honor inappropriate sources, , unambitious man not desire appropriately honored noble reasons.

gentleness (praótēs) concerning anger

book iv chapter 5. virtue of praótēs correct mean concerning anger. in contrast, excessive tendency or vice concerning anger irascibility or quickness anger. such person unfair in responses, angry @ wrong people, , on. deficient vice found in people won t defend themselves. lack spirit, , considered foolish , servile. aristotle not deny anger place in behavior of person, says should on right grounds , against right persons, , in right manner , @ right moment , right length of time . people can wrong in numerous ways, , aristotle says not easy right. in case several others several distinct types of excessive vice possible. 1 of worst types amongst these type remains angry long.

according aristotle, virtue regards anger not led emotions (pathoi), reason (logos). according aristotle, anger can virtuous , rational in right circumstances, , says small amount of excess not worth blaming either, , might praised manly , fit command. person virtue tend err on side of forgiveness rather anger, , person deficiency in virtue, despite seeming foolish , servile, closer virtue gets angry easily.

something friendship, between being obsequious , surly

book iv chapter 6. these characteristics concern attitude people have towards whether cause pain others. obsequious (areskos) person over-concerned pain cause others, backing down easily, when dishonorable or harmful so, while surly (duskolos) or quarrelsome (dusteris) person objects , not care pain cause others, never compromising. once again aristotle says has no specific greek word give correct virtuous mean avoids vices, says resembles friendship (philia). difference friendly virtue concerns behavior towards friends , strangers alike, , not involve special emotional bond friends have. concerning true friendship see books viii , ix.

according aristotle, getting virtue right involves:-

dealing differently different types of people, example people in higher position oneself, people more or less familiar you, , on.
sometimes being able share in pleasure of 1 s companions @ expense oneself, if pleasure not harmful or dishonorable.
being willing experience pain in short term longer run pleasure of greater scale.

apart vice of obsequiousness, there flattery, third vice whereby acts in obsequious way try gain advantage themselves.

honesty oneself: virtue between boasting , self-deprecation

book iv chapter 7. in translations such rackham s vice @ issue here referred in english boastfulness (greek alazoneia) , contrasted virtue concerning truthfulness. reason aristotle describes 2 kinds of untruthful pretense vices—one exaggerates things, boastfulness, , 1 under-states things. aristotle points out specific realm of honesty, concerns oneself. other types of dishonesty involve other virtues , vices, such justice , injustice.

this similar subject last 1 discussed concerning surliness , obsequiousness, in concerns how interact socially in community. in discussion, question how compromise others if painful, harmful or dishonorable. discussion turns how frank 1 should concerning 1 s own qualities. , in previous case concerning flattery, vices go far or not far enough might part of 1 s character, or might performed if in character, ulterior motive. such dishonesty involve vices of dishonesty other boastfulness or self-deprecation of course, lover of truth, truthful when nothing depends on it, praised , expected avoid being dishonest when disgraceful.

socrates used irony, aristotle considers acceptable type of dishonesty. many philosophers can away dishonest bragging, worse.

once again, aristotle said had no convenient greek word give virtuous , honest mean in case, person boasts claims qualities inappropriately, while person self-deprecates excessively makes no claim qualities have, or disparages himself. aristotle therefore names virtuous man person claims qualities has without exaggeration or understatement. in many of these examples, aristotle says excess (boastfulness) more blameworthy deficiency (being self-disparaging).

unlike treatment of flattery, described vice, aristotle describes ways in person might relatively blameless if dishonest own qualities, long not become fixed disposition boast. specifically, according aristotle boasting not blamed if aim honor or glory, blameworthy if aim money.

parts of section remarkable because of implications practice of philosophy. @ 1 point aristotle says examples of areas dishonest boasting gain might go undetected, , blameworthy, prophecy, philosophy, or medicine, of have both pretense , bragging. appears criticism of contemporary sophists. more remarkable fact 1 of vices under discussion, self-deprecation (greek eirôneia modern english irony ) adjective , used describe socrates. aristotle mentions socrates example, @ same time mentions (continuing theme) less excessive vice less blameworthy.

being witty or charming

book iv chapter 8. subject matter of discussion virtue of being witty, charming , tactful, , saying right things when speaking playfully, @ our leisure, aristotle says necessary part of life. in contrast buffoon can never resist making joke, , deficient vice in case uncultivated person not jokes, , useless in playful conversation. hard set fixed rules funny , appropriate, person virtue tend lawmaker making suitable laws themselves.

sense of shame (not virtue)

chapter 9. sense of shame not virtue, more feeling stable character trait (hexis). fear, , fitting in young, live feeling, held feeling of shame. not praise older people such sense of shame according aristotle, since shame should concern acts done voluntarily, , decent person not voluntarily shameful. aristotle mentions here self-restraint not virtue, refers later part of book (book vii) discussion of this.

leo strauss notes approach, aristotle s discussion of magnanimity (above), in contrast approach of bible.

book v: justice , fairness: moral virtue needing special discussion

book v same book iv of eudemian ethics, first of 3 books common both works. represents special discussion on justice (dikaiosunē) foreseen in earlier books, covers of same material plato s republic, though in strikingly different way.

burger (2008) points although chapter nominally follows same path (methodos) previous chapters far obvious how justice understood disposition in relation passion: proposed candidate, greed (pleonexia), seem refer, rather, vice of injustice , single opposite of virtue. in other words, not described mean between 2 extremes. indeed, burger point out, approach quite different previous chapters in way categorizes in terms of general principles, rather building commonly accepted opinions.

as aristotle points out, approach partly because people mean many different things when use word justice. primary division observes in kind of person called that, on 1 hand, mean law abiding or lawful (nominos), , on other, mean equitable or fair (isos). aristotle points out that, whatever unfair lawless, not lawless unfair, and, seem man not in every case same thing citizen. these 2 common meanings of justice coincide, extent set of laws good, lawmakers can affect, , all-encompassing meaning equates justice of lawmaker, becomes aristotle s point of reference further discussion. justice in such simple , complete , effective sense according aristotle same having complete ethical virtue, perfection of character, because not virtuous, willing , able put virtue use amongst friends , in community. according aristotle, there many can practise virtue in own private affairs cannot in relations .

aristotle, however, says that—apart complete virtue encompass not types of justice, types of excellence of character—there partial virtue gets called justice, distinct other character flaws. cowardice example, might cause soldier throw away shield , run. however, not runs battle cowardice. often, aristotle observes, these acts caused over-reaching or greed (pleonexia) , ascribed injustice. unlike virtues discussed far, unjust person not desire bad himself or herself individual, nor or desire of things, if bad him or her. such particular injustice greed aimed @ particular things such honor or money or security.

to understand how justice aims @ good, necessary beyond particular or bad things might want or not want share of individuals, , includes considering viewpoint of community (the subject of aristotle s politics). alone of virtues, says aristotle, justice looks else s , argument confronted plato in republic.

particular justice subject of book, , has been divided lawful , fair, 2 different aspects of universal justice or complete virtue. concerning areas being law-abiding might not same being fair, aristotle says should discussed under heading of politics. divides particular justice further 2 parts: distribution of divisible goods , rectification in private transactions. first part relates members of community in possible 1 person have more or less of person. second part of particular justice deals rectification in transactions , part divided 2 parts: voluntary , involuntary, , involuntary divided further furtive , violent divisions. following chart showing divisions aristotle s discussion of justice in book v, based on burger (2008) appendix 3.

in trying describe justice mean, other ethical virtues, aristotle says justice involves @ least 4 terms, namely, 2 persons whom , 2 shares just. (1131a) must fall between , little , requires distribution made between people of equal stature.

but in many cases, how judge mean not clear, because aristotle points out, if persons not equal, not have equal shares; when equals possess or allotted unequal shares, or persons not equal equal shares, quarrels , complaints arise. (1131a23-24). in distribution must take account sort of worth. parties involved different concerning deserve, , importance of key difference between distributive justice , rectificatory justice because distribution can take place among equals. aristotle not state how decide deserves more, implying depends on principles accepted in each type of community, rather states sort of proportion in intermediate between 4 elements (2 goods , 2 people). final point aristotle makes in discussion of distributive justice when 2 evils must distributed, lesser of evils more choice worthy , such greater (1131b21-25).

the second part of particular justice rectificatory , consists of voluntary , involuntary. sort of justice deals transactions between people not equals , looks @ harm or suffering caused individual. sort of blind justice since treats both parties if equal regardless of actual worth: makes no difference whether man has defrauded bad man or bad 1 1 . once again trying describe justice mean, says men require judge middle term or medium—indeed in places judges called mediators—, think if mean just. sort of mean, inasmuch judge medium between litigants . restore both parties equality, judge must take amount greater equal offender possesses , give part victim both have no more , no less equal. rule should applied rectify both voluntary , involuntary transactions.

finally, aristotle turns idea reciprocity ( eye eye ) justice, idea associates pythagoreans. problem approach justice, although normal in politics , law-making, ignores difference between different reasons doing crime. example, have been done out of passion or ignorance, , makes critical difference when comes determining reaction. in turn returns aristotle mention fact laws not same just: political justice of 2 kinds, 1 natural, other conventional. in famous statement, aristotle makes point that, many points in book 5, thought refer consideration of plato s republic. people think rules of justice merely conventional, because whereas law of nature immutable , has same validity everywhere, fire burns both here , in persia, rules of justice seen vary. aristotle insists justice both fixed in nature in sense, variable in specific way: rules of justice ordained not nature man not same in places, since forms of government not same, though in places there 1 form of government natural, namely, best form. believed people can see types of rules conventional, , nature—and felt important when trying judge whether or unjust determining whether did voluntarily or not. people commit crimes accident or due vices other greed or injustice.