Book IV. The second set of examples of moral virtues Nicomachean Ethics

1 book iv. second set of examples of moral virtues

1.1 liberality or generosity (eleutheriotēs)
1.2 magnificence
1.3 magnanimity or greatness of soul
1.4 balanced ambitiousness concerning smaller honors
1.5 gentleness (praótēs) concerning anger
1.6 friendship, between being obsequious , surly
1.7 honesty oneself: virtue between boasting , self-deprecation
1.8 being witty or charming
1.9 sense of shame (not virtue)

book iv. second set of examples of moral virtues

the set of moral virtues discussed here involves getting balance of 1 s behavior right in social or political situations, leading themes become critical development of of important themes.

book iv described being bound norms of athenian gentleman in aristotle s time. while consistent approach aristotle said take in book i, in contrast approach of plato, there long running disagreement concerning whether immersion within viewpoint of probable intended readership starting point build more general conclusions, example in book vi, or else shows aristotle failed generalize, , ethical thinking based upon beliefs of greek gentleman of time.

liberality or generosity (eleutheriotēs)

this virtue observe when see how people act regards giving money, , things worth thought of in terms of money. 2 un-virtuous extremes wastefulness , stinginess (or meanness). stinginess taking money seriously, wastefulness, less strictly speaking, not opposite (an under estimation of importance of money) because caused being unrestrained. wasteful person destroyed own acts, , has many vices @ once. aristotle s approach defining correct balance treat money other useful thing, , virtue know how use money: giving right people, right amount @ right time. also, each of ethical virtues, aristotle emphasizes such person gets pleasures , pains @ doing virtuous , beautiful thing. aristotle goes out of way emphasize generosity not virtue associated making money, because, points out, virtuous person causes beautiful things, rather being recipient. aristotle points out not give gratitude , praise @ not taking (which might earn praise being just). aristotle points out generous people loved practically of recognized virtue, since confer benefits, , consists in giving , not deny generous people won t @ maintaining wealth, , easy cheat. aristotle goes further in direction saying might seem better wasteful stingy: wasteful person cured age, , running out of resources, , if not merely unrestrained people foolish rather vicious , badly brought-up. also, wasteful person @ least benefits someone. aristotle points out person virtue not money should not it, in order give decent sort of taking goes along decent sort of giving. having said however, people call wasteful not wasteful in sense opposed being generous, unrestrained , have many vices @ once. such people wasteful , stingy @ same time, , when trying generous take sources whence should not (for example pimps, loan sharks, gamblers, thieves), , give wrong people. such people can helped guidance, unlike stingy people, , people stingy. in fact, ends aristotle, stinginess reasonably called opposite of generosity, both because greater evil wastefulness, , because people go wrong more sort of wastefulness described .

magnificence

magnificence described virtue similar generosity except deals spending large amounts of wealth. aristotle says while magnificent man liberal, liberal man not magnificent . immoderate vices in case concerning making great display on wrong occasions , in wrong way . extremes avoided in order achieve virtue paltriness (rackham) or chintziness (sachs) on 1 hand , tastelessness or vulgarity on other. aristotle reminds here has said moral dispositions (hexeis) caused activities (energeia) perform, meaning magnificent person s virtue can seen way chooses correct magnificent acts @ right times. aim of magnificence, virtue, beautiful action, not magnificent man himself on public things, such private gifts have resemblance votive offerings. because aiming @ spectacle, person virtue not focusing on doing things cheaply, petty, , or may overspend. liberality, aristotle sees potential conflict between virtues, , being money. magnificence requires spending according means, @ least in sense poor man can not magnificent. vices of paltriness , vulgar chintziness not bring serious discredit, since not injurious others, nor excessively unseemly .

magnanimity or greatness of soul

book iv, chapter 3. magnanimity latinization of original greek used here, megalopsuchia, means greatness of soul. although word magnanimity has traditional connection aristotelian philosophy, has own tradition in english, causes confusion. why modern translations refer literally greatness of soul. in particular, term implied not greatness, person thought of worthy of great thing, or in other words sort of pride. (michael davis translates pride.) although term imply negative insinuation of lofty pride, aristotle usual tries define word should mean virtue. says not claims more deserves vain , indeed small-souled of seem man claims less deserves when deserts great . being vain, or being small-souled, 2 extremes fail achieve mean of virtue of magnanimity. small souled person, according aristotle, seems have bad him .

to have virtue of greatness of soul, , worthy of greatest, 1 must in true sense, , possess great in virtues. sachs points out: greatness of soul first of 4 virtues aristotle find require presence of virtues of character. others type of justice (1129b in book v), phronesis or practical judgment shown leaders (1144b in book vi), , friends (1157a in book viii). aristotle views magnanimity sort of adornment of moral virtues; makes them greater, , not arise without them.

aristotle focuses on question of greatest things 1 may worthy of. @ first says spoken of in terms of external goods, observes greatest of these must honor, because assign gods, , people of highest standing aim at. qualifies saying great souled people hold moderately toward every type of or bad fortune, honor. being good, , being worthy of honor more important. (the disdain of great souled person towards kinds of non-human things can make great souled people seem arrogant, un-deserving vain person.) leo strauss notes there close kinship between aristotle s justice , biblical justice, aristotle s magnanimity, means man s habitual claiming himself great honors while deserves these honors, alien bible . strauss describes bible rejecting concept of gentleman, , displays different approach problem of divine law in greek , biblical civilization. see below concerning sense of shame.

aristotle lists typical characteristics of great souled people:

they not take small risks, , not devoted risk taking, take big risks, without regard life, because worse life worth less great life. indeed, few things, , slow start on things, unless there great honor involved.
they not esteem popularly esteemed, nor others at. take few things seriously, , not anxious.
they gladly favors ashamed receive them, being apt forget favor another, or greater 1 in return. pleased hear discussion favors have done others, not favors done them.
they apt act more high-handedly person of high station person of middle or low standing, below them.
they frank in expressing opinions , open hate , love. not due fear, or esteem 1 has of other s opinions on own.
they lead life choose , not suits others, slave-like.
they not given wonder, nothing seems great them.
because expect others lesser, , not overly concerned praise, not apt bear grudges, not apt gossip, , not interested in speaking ill of enemies, except insult them.
they not apt complain necessities or small matters, nor ask help, not wanting imply such things important them.
they tend possess beautiful , useless things, rather productive ones.
they tend move , speak deep steady voice, rather being hasty or shrill, due anxiety.

a balanced ambitiousness concerning smaller honors

book iv, chapter 4. in parallel distinction of scale made between normal generosity , magnificence, aristotle proposes there 2 types of virtue associated honors, 1 concerned great honors, magnanimity or greatness of soul , 1 more normal honors. latter virtue kind of correct respect honor, aristotle had no greek word for, said between being ambitious (philotimos honor-loving) , unambitious (aphilotimos not honor loving) respect honor. include noble , manly person appropriate ambition, or less ambitious person moderate , temperate. (in other words, aristotle makes clear not think being more philotimos average inappropriate.) have correct balance in virtue means pursuing right types of honor right types of source of honor. in contrast, ambitious man balance wrong seeking excess honor inappropriate sources, , unambitious man not desire appropriately honored noble reasons.

gentleness (praótēs) concerning anger

book iv chapter 5. virtue of praótēs correct mean concerning anger. in contrast, excessive tendency or vice concerning anger irascibility or quickness anger. such person unfair in responses, angry @ wrong people, , on. deficient vice found in people won t defend themselves. lack spirit, , considered foolish , servile. aristotle not deny anger place in behavior of person, says should on right grounds , against right persons, , in right manner , @ right moment , right length of time . people can wrong in numerous ways, , aristotle says not easy right. in case several others several distinct types of excessive vice possible. 1 of worst types amongst these type remains angry long.

according aristotle, virtue regards anger not led emotions (pathoi), reason (logos). according aristotle, anger can virtuous , rational in right circumstances, , says small amount of excess not worth blaming either, , might praised manly , fit command. person virtue tend err on side of forgiveness rather anger, , person deficiency in virtue, despite seeming foolish , servile, closer virtue gets angry easily.

something friendship, between being obsequious , surly

book iv chapter 6. these characteristics concern attitude people have towards whether cause pain others. obsequious (areskos) person over-concerned pain cause others, backing down easily, when dishonorable or harmful so, while surly (duskolos) or quarrelsome (dusteris) person objects , not care pain cause others, never compromising. once again aristotle says has no specific greek word give correct virtuous mean avoids vices, says resembles friendship (philia). difference friendly virtue concerns behavior towards friends , strangers alike, , not involve special emotional bond friends have. concerning true friendship see books viii , ix.

according aristotle, getting virtue right involves:-

dealing differently different types of people, example people in higher position oneself, people more or less familiar you, , on.
sometimes being able share in pleasure of 1 s companions @ expense oneself, if pleasure not harmful or dishonorable.
being willing experience pain in short term longer run pleasure of greater scale.

apart vice of obsequiousness, there flattery, third vice whereby acts in obsequious way try gain advantage themselves.

honesty oneself: virtue between boasting , self-deprecation

book iv chapter 7. in translations such rackham s vice @ issue here referred in english boastfulness (greek alazoneia) , contrasted virtue concerning truthfulness. reason aristotle describes 2 kinds of untruthful pretense vices—one exaggerates things, boastfulness, , 1 under-states things. aristotle points out specific realm of honesty, concerns oneself. other types of dishonesty involve other virtues , vices, such justice , injustice.

this similar subject last 1 discussed concerning surliness , obsequiousness, in concerns how interact socially in community. in discussion, question how compromise others if painful, harmful or dishonorable. discussion turns how frank 1 should concerning 1 s own qualities. , in previous case concerning flattery, vices go far or not far enough might part of 1 s character, or might performed if in character, ulterior motive. such dishonesty involve vices of dishonesty other boastfulness or self-deprecation of course, lover of truth, truthful when nothing depends on it, praised , expected avoid being dishonest when disgraceful.

socrates used irony, aristotle considers acceptable type of dishonesty. many philosophers can away dishonest bragging, worse.

once again, aristotle said had no convenient greek word give virtuous , honest mean in case, person boasts claims qualities inappropriately, while person self-deprecates excessively makes no claim qualities have, or disparages himself. aristotle therefore names virtuous man person claims qualities has without exaggeration or understatement. in many of these examples, aristotle says excess (boastfulness) more blameworthy deficiency (being self-disparaging).

unlike treatment of flattery, described vice, aristotle describes ways in person might relatively blameless if dishonest own qualities, long not become fixed disposition boast. specifically, according aristotle boasting not blamed if aim honor or glory, blameworthy if aim money.

parts of section remarkable because of implications practice of philosophy. @ 1 point aristotle says examples of areas dishonest boasting gain might go undetected, , blameworthy, prophecy, philosophy, or medicine, of have both pretense , bragging. appears criticism of contemporary sophists. more remarkable fact 1 of vices under discussion, self-deprecation (greek eirôneia modern english irony ) adjective , used describe socrates. aristotle mentions socrates example, @ same time mentions (continuing theme) less excessive vice less blameworthy.

being witty or charming

book iv chapter 8. subject matter of discussion virtue of being witty, charming , tactful, , saying right things when speaking playfully, @ our leisure, aristotle says necessary part of life. in contrast buffoon can never resist making joke, , deficient vice in case uncultivated person not jokes, , useless in playful conversation. hard set fixed rules funny , appropriate, person virtue tend lawmaker making suitable laws themselves.

sense of shame (not virtue)

chapter 9. sense of shame not virtue, more feeling stable character trait (hexis). fear, , fitting in young, live feeling, held feeling of shame. not praise older people such sense of shame according aristotle, since shame should concern acts done voluntarily, , decent person not voluntarily shameful. aristotle mentions here self-restraint not virtue, refers later part of book (book vii) discussion of this.

leo strauss notes approach, aristotle s discussion of magnanimity (above), in contrast approach of bible.