Book I Nicomachean Ethics

1 book i

1.1 should study ethics, , how
1.2 defining happiness (eudaimonia) , aim of ethics
1.3 questions might raised definition
1.4 defining happiness discussion of virtue: introduction rest of ethics

book i

book attempts both define subject matter , justify method has been chosen (in chapters 3, 4, 6 , 7). part of this, aristotle considers common opinions along opinions of poets , philosophers.

who should study ethics, , how

concerning accuracy , whether ethics can treated in objective way, aristotle points out things beautiful , just, politics investigates, involve great disagreement , inconsistency, thought belong convention , not nature . reason aristotle claims important not demand precision, demonstrations demand mathematician, rather treat beautiful , things part. can because people judges of acquainted with, in turn implies young (in age or in character), being inexperienced, not suitable study of type of political subject.

chapter 6 contains famous digression in aristotle appears question friends introduced forms . understood referring plato , school, famous known theory of forms. aristotle says while both truth , 1 s friends loved, sacred thing give highest honor truth . section yet explanation of why ethics not start first principles, mean starting out trying discuss universal thing things called have in common. aristotle says while different things called not seem have same name chance, perhaps better let go because attempt @ precision more @ home in type of philosophic inquiry , , not seem helpful discussing how particular humans should act, in same way doctors not need philosophize on definition of health in order treat each case. in other words, aristotle insisting on importance of distinction between theoretical , practical philosophy, , nicomachean ethics practical.

defining happiness (eudaimonia) , aim of ethics

the main stream of discussion starts well-known opening of chapter 1, assertion technical arts, investigations (every methodos, including ethics itself), indeed deliberate actions , choice, aim @ apart themselves. aristotle points fact many aims intermediate aims, , desired because make achievement of higher aims possible.

in chapter 2, aristotle asserts there 1 highest aim, eudaimonia (traditionally translated happiness ), , must same aim politics should have, because best individual less beautiful (kalos) , divine (theios) people (ethnos) or city (polis). politics rules on practical life proper aim of politics should include proper aim of other pursuits, end human (tanthrōpinon agathon) . human practical target, , contrasts plato s references . concludes known chapter 2 of book 1 stating ethics ( our investigation or methodos) in way political .

chapter 3 goes on elaborate on methodological concern exactness. ethics, unlike other types of philosophy, inexact , uncertain. aristotle says unreasonable expect strict mathematical style demonstrations, each man judges correctly matters acquainted .

chapter 4 states while agree call highest aim of humanity (eudaimonia), , equate both living , doing things well, there dispute between people, , between majority (hoi polloi) , wise . chapter 5 distinguishes 3 distinct ways of life different people associate happiness.

the slavish way of pleasure, way majority of people think of happiness.
the refined , active way of politics, aims @ honor, (honor implying higher divinity of wise , know , judge, , potentially honor, political people).
the way of contemplation.

aristotle mentions 2 other possibilities argues can put aside:

having virtue being inactive, suffering evils , misfortunes, aristotle says no 1 consider unless defending hypothesis. (as sachs points out, indeed plato depicts socrates doing in gorgias.)
money making, aristotle asserts life based on aiming @ pursued necessity in order achieve higher goals, intermediate good.

each of these 3 commonly proposed happy ways of life represents targets people aim @ own sake, aim @ happiness own sake. concerning honor, pleasure, , intelligence (nous) , every virtue, though lead happiness, if did not still pursue them.

happiness in life then, includes virtues, , aristotle adds include self-sufficiency (autarkeia), not self-sufficiency of hermit, of family, friends , community. make life choiceworthy , lacking nothing. describe more happiness like, aristotle next asks work (ergon) of human is. living things have nutrition , growth work, animals (according definition of animal aristotle used) have perceiving part of work, more particularly human? answer according aristotle must involve articulate speech (logos), including both being open persuasion reasoning, , thinking things through. not human happiness involve reason, active being-at-work (energeia), not potential happiness. , on lifetime, because 1 swallow not make spring . definition given therefore:

the of man active exercise of soul s faculties in conformity excellence or virtue, or if there several human excellences or virtues, in conformity best , perfect among them. moreover, happy takes complete lifetime; 1 swallow not make spring.

and because happiness being described work or function of humans, can contrast harpists serious harpists, person lives , beautifully in actively rational , virtuous way serious (spoudaios) human.

as example of popular opinions happiness, aristotle cites ancient 1 , agreed philosophers . according opinion, says right, things associated soul governing , good, when compared things of body, or external things. aristotle says virtue, practical judgment , wisdom, , pleasure, associated happiness, , indeed association external abundance, consistent definition.

if happiness virtue, or virtue, must not condition of being virtuous, potentially, actual way of virtuously being @ work human. in ancient olympic games, not beautiful or strongest crowned, compete . , such virtue good, beautiful , pleasant, indeed aristotle asserts in people different pleasures in conflict each other while things pleasant passionately devoted beautiful things pleasant nature , of sort actions in accordance virtue . external goods necessary in such virtuous life, because person lacks things such family , friends might find difficult happy.

questions might raised definition

in chapters 9-12, aristotle addresses objections or questions might raised against definition of happiness far.

first considers definition of happiness in contrast old socratic question (found example in plato s meno) of whether happiness might result of learning or habit or training, or perhaps divine lot or chance. aristotle says admits of being shared sort of learning , taking pains. despite this, if not divine, 1 of divine things, , greatest , beautiful left chance discordant .


neoptolemus killing priam. aristotle accepted wrong call priam unhappy because last years unhappy.



aristotle justifies saying happiness must considered on whole lifetime because otherwise priam, example, defined unhappy because of unhappy old age.
concerning importance of chance happiness, aristotle argues happy person @ work in accordance virtue bear misfortune brings beautifully , in complete harmony in every instance . many great misfortunes limit how blessed such life can be, in these circumstances beautiful shines through .
addressing opinion expected amongst contemporaries happiness, aristotle says seems unfeeling , contrary people s opinions claim fortunes of 1 s descendants , 1 s friends have no influence @ . says seems if @ gets through deceased, whether or reverse, faint , small .
once again turning divinity of happiness aristotle distinguishes virtue , happiness saying virtue, through people become apt @ performing beautiful actions praiseworthy, while happiness more important, god, since every 1 of else sake of this, , set down source , cause of things honored , divine .

from defining happiness discussion of virtue: introduction rest of ethics

aristotle asserts can usefully accept things said soul (clearly cross reference plato again), including division of soul rational , irrational parts, , further division of irrational parts 2 parts also:

one irrational part of human soul not human vegetative , @ work during sleep, when virtue least obvious.
a second irrational part of human soul able share in reason in way. see because know there desiring , appetitive in soul can, on different occasions in different people, either oppose reason, or obey it—thus being rational rational when listen father being rational.

the virtues divided, intellectual (dianoetic) virtues, , virtues of character (ethical or moral virtues) pertaining irrational part of soul, can take part in reason.

these virtues of character, or moral virtues translated, become central topic in book ii. intellectual aspect of virtue discussed in book vi.